We investigate the relationship between earnings management through intertemporal transfers of earnings and the efficiency of corporate investment decisions. Using discretionary accruals to measure intertemporal transfers of earnings, we show that earnings management exhibits a concave relationship with the investment sensitivity to investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q. We find that the association is concentrated among high Q firms. The effect is present among well governed firms, suggesting that better governed firms manage accruals strategically. The concave relationship suggests that the marginal impact of earnings management on investment efficiency decreases with the amount of earnings management. Using cases of misreporting that violate the GAAP guidelines, we document that a more severe form of earnings management does not improve investment efficiency. Taken together, these results support the view that a moderate amount of earnings management helps improve corporate investment decisions while an excessive amount undoes the potential benefit of earnings management.
Introduction
This study empirically investigates how the use of intertemporal transfers of earnings affects a firm's investment policy. Managers' discretion over accruals, defined as the difference between earnings and cash flows, allows for such transfer without violating the guidelines of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). We argue that earnings management, though often associated with poor corporate governance or fraudulent behavior, can be used by managers to signal good earnings prospects to investors. In perfect capital markets, accruals management is irrelevant since all information is observable and verifiable. However, in a world with market frictions, accruals management can serve as a tool to help overcome information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders, improving access to external financing and internal asset allocation decisions. Managing accruals to obtain external financing, while sometimes viewed as opportunistic, can facilitate better investment decisions to the extent that these funds are used to finance value-enhancing projects. Discretion over accruals may allow internal funds to be allocated for valuable investment projects rather than for real earnings management: In the absence of managerial discretion over accruals, managers may resort to value-destructive real earnings management by delaying or foregoing investment, improving short-term profit at the expense of long-term firm value. According to Graham et al.'s (2005) survey of over 400 executives, managers candidly admit that they would take real economic actions such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, and would even give up positive NPV projects, to meet short-term earnings benchmarks. In this study, we explore whether strategic earnings management can improve investment decisions. Specifically, we examine whether the ability to transfer earnings between periods allows managers to better align the firm's investment decisions with its investment opportunities.
The 2001-2002 accounting scandals and the subsequent regulatory response have highlighted the opportunistic aspect of accruals management, which are typically in violation of GAAP guidelines. A large body of literature has examined the causes and effects of fraudulent reporting 1 . In particular, some studies have stressed the association between aggressive earn-ings management and financial policies including investment decisions. Kedia and Philippon (2009) , for example, document that poorly performing firms overinvest and overstate their financial statements to mimic their better performing peers. McNichols and Stubben (2008) document that firms misreporting earnings overinvest during the misreporting period. However, the prior accounting literature also demonstrates that managerial discretion over accruals can enhance earnings' informativeness. Managers can use accruals to signal private information about the firm. Discretionary accruals, a discretionary portion of total accruals, help managers produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance than using nondiscretionary accruals alone (Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; Subramanyam, 1996) . The signal is quite credible despite managerial discretion over accruals because accruals management does not allow for permanent changes in earnings but only for a shift over time.
We test our prediction by examining the association between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and investment efficiency. Discretionary accruals, estimated using a crosssectional version of the modified Jones model and expressed as percentage of lagged assets, have been used widely to proxy for accounting-based earnings management. 2 We evaluate investment efficiency as the sensitivity of investment expenditures to investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q. We augment the standard investment specification to allow for interactions between Q and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. For our analysis, we consider firms in the Compustat universe between 1989 and 2012 excluding financial and utility industries. Controlling for Tobin's Q and cash flows, we find that accruals management has a concave relationship with the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q. That is, the additional usage of accruals improves investment decisions to a certain point, beyond which the investment-Q sensitivity deteriorates. Furthermore, we document that this pattern is mainly driven by high-Q firms. Despite having more investment opportunities, high-Q firms in our sample manifest a lower investment-Q sensitivity than low-Q firms. The result highlights the importance of strategic accruals management by showing that the benefit of accruals management is greater for firms with more investment needs.
The concave relationship documented above suggests effects on investment decisions vary with the amount of earnings management. A modest amount of earnings management is associated with better investment responses to changing investment opportunities. However, marginal benefit diminishes with earnings management, suggesting that excessive earnings management hurts investment efficiency. We further check a case of excessive earnings management by examining firms misreporting financial statements only to restate in later dates.
Accruals management tends to be modest in nature. First, accruals are managed within the boundary of GAAP. Second, accruals management requires that the sum of a firm's income over all years equal the sum of its cash flows, meaning that managers must at some point in time reverse any excessive accruals made in the past. On the other hand, misreporting is often in violation of GAAP and sometimes results in SEC investigations or lawsuits, incurring large economic costs. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) examine the firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentations and find that the size of lost sales and higher contracting and financing costs resulting from the earnings manipulation outweigh the amount inflated by manipulation. Firms that restate their accounting statements in later dates face tighter loan contract terms including higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions (Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2008) . Given the relatively large expected costs, value-maximizing managers are not likely to rely on such aggressive earnings management. Consistent with this interpretation, we find misreporting that leads to restatement in future dates does not improve the investment-Q sensitivity. The results reinforce the concave relation documented earlier: The cost of earnings management starts outweighing its benefit beyond a certain level.
One concern in interpreting the results is that unobserved factors may drive accruals management and the investment-Q association simultaneously, generating a spurious correlation.
We address this concern by employing a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology. This approach is well suited for attempting to disentangle causality in a quasi-experimental setting.
We compare changes in investment efficiency for a sample of firms subject to an exogenous reduction in earnings management to changes in investment efficiency for those that were not affected by the event. Specifically, we examine the effects of earnings management by using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Undoubtedly, SOX affected the way firms manage their earnings. SOX was intended to curve earnings management and, indeed, various studies document significant declines in the accruals management practice in the post-SOX periods. We select control groups in two different ways. First, we use the pre-SOX years as the control period and examine within firm variation in investment efficiency around the enactment of SOX, where firms act as their own controls. Second, for our DID estimation, we select firms in the United Kingdom and Canada as our control group since SOX influences all firms in the U.S. (our treatment group). The UK and Canada are considered to have similar accounting guidelines and practices. In addition, investment expenditures for firms in these countries follow similar time series patterns as those of the US firms. Our DID regressions show a large reduction in investment efficiency for US firms around the passage of SOX. This provides support for the hypothesis that the decline in the use of earnings management after SOX reduced investment sensitivity to investment opportunities for US firms.
Finally, we examine how well-governed firms view accruals management that can potentially improve investment response to investment opportunities. A recent literature has focused on the opportunistic aspect of earnings management and has linked earnings management to poor corporate governance (e.g., Klein, 2002; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008) . However, the size of discretionary accruals alone does not address the strategic aspect of accruals management that can help secure internal or external funds necessary for valuable investment projects. A corporate governance mechanism should be designed to deter earnings management intended to manipulate earnings, but should not discourage accruals management that can improve resource allocation to finance valuable investment projects. We test this hypothesis by examining the association between accruals management and investment sensitivity to investment opportunities separately for well-governed and poorly-governed firms. We utilize G-index, E-index, and the presence of three individual provisions (poison pill, classified board, and golden parachutes provisions) to sort firms into two subgroups. We find that good governance and bad governance groups exhibit a previously documented concave relation between accrual management and investment-Q sensitivity. Better governed firms show a stronger association for some of the governance measures. This result suggests that well-governed firms do not discourage the strategic usage of accruals and effectively manage accruals in response to their investment opportunities.
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of managerial discretion to transfer earnings between periods as a better alternative to real earnings management that sacrifices valuable investment projects. Prior literature suggests the effect of accruals on investment decisions can work through both the internal resource allocation channel and external financing channel. First, accruals allows managers to allocate internal funds for valuable investment projects rather than for meeting earnings benchmarks, improving internal resource allocation.
Many studies document that firms have been engaging in real earnings management in various ways including price discounts, overproduction, delaying R&D investment, reduction of discretionary expenditures, stock repurchase, and sale of profitable assets. 3 The real earnings management has direct real consequences. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that firms engaging in real earnings management may deviate from normal business practices and thus experience a decline in their subsequent operating performances. Underperformance following seasoned equity offerings is more severe for firms engaging in real management than those managing accruals (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) . Firms seem to sacrifice employment, R&D, and other investment to finance EPS-increasing stock repurchases (Almeida et al., 2013) .
Second, accruals management can influence investment decisions through the channel of external financing. Firms seem to manage discretionary accruals to obtain financing as suggested by abnormally high levels of positive accruals in the periods preceding stock issuances (Chen, Gu, and Tang, 2008; DuCharme, 2004; Friedlan, 1994; Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a,b) . Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) also document increased earnings managements measured by pensions assumptions prior to acquisition activities. However, this evidence alone does not speak to the role of accruals in the efficiency of investment decisions. Linck, Netter, and Shu (2013) take a step toward this direction by examining financially constrained firms with valuable investment projects. They find that these firms use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects to raise capital necessary for the investments.
3 Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006; Hribar et al., 2006; Cheng, 2004; Almeida et al., 2013; Herrmann et al. 2003; Bartov, 1993; Jackson and Wilcox, 2000; Gunny, 2010 We also contribute to the recent literature linking real investment decisions to earnings management. Zhang (2007) , Wu, Zhang and Zhang (2010) , Arif et. al (2016) , among others, argue that accruals reflect real investment choices of firms. Wu, Zhang, and Zhang (2010) link the accrual anomaly, where firms with high accruals earn abnormally low returns on average, to real investment in a Q-theory framework. In their model, discount rates vary negatively with accruals and investment, therefore predicting lower future returns. Arif et. al (2016) show that like real investment, accruals decline significantly when economic uncertainty is high, consistent with the view that accounting accruals and investment are strongly linked. (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011) , and the choice depends on their relative costs (Zang 2012) . Because accruals management is easier to detect in nature than real activity manipulation, the heightened scrutiny post SOX is likely to have increased the relative cost of accruals management, reducing accounting flexibility in GAAP. In fact, empirical evidence indicates that accruals management has decreased since the implementation of SOX. Lobo and Zhou (2010) document lower discretionary accruals post SOX. Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2008) document that the propensity to engage in income-increasing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks has declined. Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and Cohen (2009) document that the level of accruals-based earnings management declined in the post-SOX period while the level of real activities manipulation increased, suggesting a shift from accruals management to real management. Our examination of the association between accruals management and investment decisions has implications for understanding the real benefits and costs of corporate disclosure policies.
Data and Methodology

Accruals
We utilize the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the measure of a moderate earnings management. We consider accruals management moderate for the following two reasons.
First, since the sum of a firm's income over all years must equal the sum of its cash flows, managers must at some point in time reverse any "excessive" accruals made in the past. Therefore, it is unlikely to observe an extreme accruals management that persists over time. Second, an accruals management is within the boundary of GAAP and therefore is unlikely to be extreme by definition. In general, an accruals management does not incur severe economic costs as do earnings managements violating the GAAP, which are often followed by restatements and, in some cases, SEC investigations or lawsuits.
Total accruals are defined as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operations and is constructed by subtracting Cash Flow from Operations (Compustat item OANCF) from Net Income (item NI), scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. We decompose total accruals to separate the component that are beyond the control of the managers. We estimate a modified version of Jones model of accruals (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) ), which regresses total accruals on changes in revenue and gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) to control for changes in nondiscretionary accruals caused by changing conditions. Total accruals includes changes in working capital accounts, such as accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts payable that depend on changes in revenues to some degree. Thus revenues are used to control for the economic environment of the firm because they capture the firms' operations before managers' manipulations. Gross PPE is included to control for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. To summarize, we estimate the following model on our sample by each industry group and year 4 :
We utilize Fama-French's definition of 48 industries where TA is total accruals scaled by the beginning-of-year assets, ∆REV is the change in sales normalized by beginning assets and PPE is gross property plant and equipment scaled by beginning assets. We then feed these estimates to the following equation to obtain discretionary accrual (DA).
where b j is the estimated value of β j ( j= 0, 1, 2, 3). DA is essentially the discretionary portion of total accruals expressed as a percentage of the lagged assets. Note that the change in accounts receivable (∆REC) is subtracted from the change in revenues to allow for the manipulation of credit sales. The original Jones (1991) Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenues while the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) ) adjusts the change in revenues for the changes in receivables to control for potential revenues manipulation. Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we employ the original Jones model. Throughout the paper, we utilize absolute value of discretionary accruals since earnings manipulation involves both positive and negative values of accruals.
Data
We consider all firms between 1989 and 2012 that are available in the merged Center for
Research on Security Prices-Compustat Industrial Annual database. We exclude financial services firms, regulated utilities, and firms with book values smaller than $10 million. We also drop observations with the missing total asset information. These steps result in a sample of 99,528 firm-year observations. The main variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Test Results
Baseline Specification
In this section, we investigate our main hypothesis that the accruals management can be utilized to improve the investment-Q relationship. We augment the standard investment regression specification as follows:
where i indexes a firm and t indexes time. The dependent variable is investment scaled by beginning-of-year capital. | DA it | is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. | DA | ·Q and | DA | 2 ·Q are of particular interest because they capture differences in investment-Q sensitivity across firms with a varying degree of accruals management. The quadratic term is introduced to account for the possibility that the effect of accruals management may not be linear. Time and firm fixed effects are included. We also replace firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects in some specifications. Our industry definition is drawn from Fama/French's classification of 48 industries. We next investigate whether the association between accruals management and the investments-Q sensitivity changes with investment opportunities. Panel B of Table 1 shows that investment increases with | DA | but the size of the increase differs considerably across different Q quartiles. We further examine this dynamics by sorting the sample into two subgroups based on Q and estimating the baseline specification separately for the two subsamples. Table 3 | DA | ·Q, is no longer statistically significant. Overall, the documented association seems to be mainly driven by high Q firms. This highlights the importance of strategic accruals management because accruals have bigger effects where they are needed the most. That is, the effects are more pronounced in the subsample with relatively lower investment-Q sensitivity in the benchmark cases (first two regressions). Furthermore, these firms are the ones with strong growth potentials, for which investment decisions are especially critical.
Restatements
The concave relationship documented in the previous section suggests that the marginal improvement in the investment-Q sensitivity diminishes with the size of discretionary accruals.
To corroborate this result, we consider a more extreme form of earnings management, financial misreporting that requires restatements in later dates. The degree of misreporting varies considerably among restating firms from a minor misapplication of accounting principles to an outright fraud. While accruals management is a legitimate tool that allows managers to exert discretion over reported earnings across time, misreporting is a clear violation of GAAP, resulting in SEC investigations or lawsuits in some cases. Because misreporting is more likely to be driven by opportunistic earnings management, we do not expect such earnings management to be associated with improvement in the investment-Q sensibility.
We start with the restatement announcement data provided by the United States General Accoutring Office (GAO). The data contain announcements made between January 1997 and We modify the baseline investment specification by replacing | DA | with a restate dummy variable as follows:
where Restate is set to one if misreporting that subsequently results in restatements occurs in the given firm-year. Note that a quadratic association cannot be tested in this setting be- We examine the effects of earnings management on investment by using the passage of SOX. SOX instituted a number of provisions including improving the composition and function of audit committees, CEO and CFO financial statement certification, restrictions on nonaudit-related work by the companys auditors, mandatory audit partner rotation, and an annual report on internal controls. Empirical evidence shows that accruals management de-creased quickly and significantly after SOX. Lobo and Zhou (2010) document lower discretionary accruals post SOX. Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2008) document that the propensity to engage in income-increasing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks has declined. Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and Cohen (2009) document that the level of accruals-based earnings management declined in the post-SOX period while the level of real activities manipulation increased, suggesting a shift from accruals management to real management. In our sample, the average amount of discretionary accruals (in absolute value) was 19.1% of total assets. After the enactment of SOX, the average value of discretionary accruals fell to 13.2% of assets, representing a 31% decline in the use of discretionary accruals. We use this shock to the use of discretionary accruals to examine the impact of earnings management on investment efficiency.
An important challenge is that the SOX Act was at the national level and hence affected most firms in the US, complicating the formation of a good control group of firms. To deal with this complication, we estimate changes in investment efficiency around SOX in two ways. First, we estimate investment regressions with firm fixed effects and include a post-SOX dummy variable. In this estimation, the firms in the sample are also the control group, where the pre-SOX time years represents the control period and the post-SOX years the treatment period. Specifically, we estimate the regression
where α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, 1 (SOX) is a dummy variable taking a value of one in the years following the implementation of SOX. The coefficient β 1 captures level changes in investment rates around SOX and β 3 , the main coefficient of interest, captures changes in investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q in the post-SOX period.
The first column of Table 5 reports the estimation results for the post-SOX analysis of investment efficiency. The coefficient on the interaction between Tobin's Q and the post-SOX dummy variable is negative and statistically significant, representing a decline in investment efficiency following SOX. The value of the coefficient, -0.0227, represents a decline of about 27% in investment efficiency following the negative shock to the use of discretionary accruals after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
An alternative approach to comparing investment investment efficiency before and after SOX within the US is to compare changes in investment for firms affected by SOX to firms that were not affected around the same time period. To this, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. The DID methodology we employ compares the effect of SOX on groups affected by the regulation (treatment group) to those that are unaffected (control group). The inferences are made by calculating the changes in investment levels and efficiency of treatment firms around the event to the changes around the event for the control firms. We choose to construct a set of control firms using data from Canada and the United Kingdom, as firms in these countries tend to be affected by similar economic shocks as firms in the US but were not subject to the changes brought on by SOX. Assuming that the control firms' investment policies are being driven by similar dynamics over time, it will allow us to control for common economic shocks and also to alleviate potential bias due to other changes in law around SOX that could have affected the treatment group.
To investigate the effect of SOX on investment efficiency in a DID framework, we estimate the following regression:
where α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, 1 (SOX) is a dummy variable taking a value of one in the years following the implementation of SOX and zero otherwise, and 1 (i=T ) is a dummy variable set equal to one for firms that belong to the treatment group and zero for firms in the control group. The coefficient η on the interaction between the two indicator variables and Tobin's Q captures the difference-in-differences effect on investment and is the main estimate of interest in the regression. The coefficient ν picks up the difference-in-differences effect on investment levels.
A challenge with employing the DID methodology around the passage of SOX is that there are other factors, both observable and unobservable, that may influence investment in the United States and other countries around the enactment of SOX. The DID regression is helpful in that it allows for the control of omitted variables that affect the treatment and control group similarly. However, identification of the causal effect of SOX on investment requires controlling for other shocks to the treatment group that may be correlated with the timing of SOX. For example, the decline in investment efficiency around the passage of SOX may have been more significant for US firms due to different sensitivities to the global business cycle.
We address this and related concerns in a variety of ways. First, we include firm level controls, particularly Tobin's Q and cash flow, to control for changing investment opportunities over time. Second, in robustness checks 7 , we include industry by year fixed effects to control for industry/time variation and find similar results.
Before reporting the results, we examine whether the use of Canadian and UK firms are appropriate to use as controls. An important assumption in the way we construct treatment and control groups is that the outcome in both groups would follow the same time trend in the absence of the treatment. While this assumption is very difficult to verify, we can look at pre-treatment trends to see if investment followed a similar pattern prior to the enactment of SOX. Figure 1 shows mean investment rates for the two treatment and control groups around the passage of SOX. The figure shows that investment rates for both treatment and control firms moved roughly in parallel before the policy change. After the enactment of SOX, the treatment firms show a slower rate of increase in investment rates compared to firms in Canada and the UK. Figure 1 supports the assumption that trends in investment rates were similar prior to the passage of SOX. We also examine changes in the full distribution of investment for both treatment and control firms. In Figure 2 we plot the kernel densities of investment rates for both treatment and control firms before and after the policy change. The distribution of investment rates shifts to the left for the treatment firms but not significantly for the control firms, suggesting the presence of an effect of SOX on corporate investment. The shift in the density for the treatment group is statistically significant as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 7 Results available upon request.
the equality of the distributions is rejected at the 1% level. The figures show that there appears to be a change in investment for treatment groups compared to control groups.
Columns (2) through (4) of Table 5 report the results of the DID regression. The second column compares changes in investment efficiency for US firms compared to both UK and Canadian firms. The coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment effect and Tobin's Q is negative and statistically significant with a magnitude of -0.0339, suggesting a reduction in investment efficiency for US firms around the passage of SOX relative to firms in Canada and the UK. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the difference-in-difference methodology separately for Canadian and UK firms as control groups and find similar results. We also note that the interaction between treatment/control and the SOX dummy is significant and negative. The negative coefficient of -0.0327 suggests that investment rates were also affected negatively by the passage of SOX. The magnitudes of changes in investment efficiency relative to Canadian and UK firms are similar to the magnitude measured in the US only sample reported in column 1. While the identifying assumptions differ across our approaches, the results are consistent and lend support to the hypothesis that the decline in the use of earnings management after SOX reduced investment efficiency for US firms.
Corporate governance and accruals management
The recent literature has focused on the opportunistic aspect of earnings management and has linked earnings management to poor corporate governance. Klein (2002) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) document that independence of audit committee and corporate board is negatively associated with earnings management and restatement. Kedia and Philippon (2009) examine restating firms and report that firms with poor governance are more likely to misreport accounting statements to restate in later dates. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) document that the usage of discretionary accruals is reduced by better governance measured by institutional ownership of shares, institutional investor representation on the board of directors, and the presence of independent outside directors on the board. Cheng (2008) reports that a larger board is associated with a smaller variation in accruals. However, these studies focus on the size of discretionary accruals and do not consider their interaction with investment decisions. The size of discretionary accruals alone does not indicate whether they were used for fraudulent accounting or to help align investment opportunities with internal or external resources. While a corporate governance mechanism should be designed to deter accounting fraud, it should not discourage strategic management of accruals to the extent that it is within the GAAP boundary and improves investment efficiency. If the strategic usage of discretionary accruals can improve investment decisions, we expect to observe the documented concave relation in well governed firms as well. We test this hypothesis by examining the association between accruals management and investment sensitivity to investment opportunities separately for well-governed and poorly-governed firms.
We sort the firms into two subgroups based on the degree of corporate governance. Five measures of governance are employed including the G-index by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) , and the presence of three individual provisions (poison pill, classified board, and golden parachutes provisions). The absence of each of the individual provisions is considered good governance, as the presence of those provisions weakens the power of the shareholders in favor of managers. Similarly, a firm is classified as having good governance if the value of G-index is lower than the median of its distribution. As in Masulis, Wang, and Xie(2007) and Schmidt (2015) , low E-index is defined as those with an E-index smaller than three. Table 6 summarizes the usage of accruals and other firm characteristics for the two subgroups. The first column shows that the differences in total accruals between the two subgroups are very small and statistically insignificant across all measures. The second column reports that the absolute values of discretionary accruals are somewhat different across the two subgroups. To the extent that these measures capture the quality of governance, better governed firms tend to have higher absolute values of discretionary accruals. If the usage of discretionary accruals were motivated exclusively by opportunistic reasons, we would expect the usage of discretionary accruals to be higher for poorly governed firms. However, it appears that better governed firms do not discourage the usage of discretionary accruals. These firms also seem to differ in other dimensions. Well governed firms invest more, have more investment opportunities proxied by Q, and have more cash flows. The result is consistent with the previous studies documenting a negative correlation between governance measures and Tobin's Q (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009 ).
We next conduct a multivariate analysis by estimating the baseline specification for the two subgroups separately. The first four columns of Table 7 report the regression results for subgroups formed based on the G-index and E-index. In both cases, both well governed and poorly governed subgroups show a concave relation between accruals managements and investment-Q sensitivity. The next three columns sort the firms based on the presence of each of the individual provisions. The results are similar regardless of which of the three governance measures is used. A small exception is that when a golden parachute provision is utilized, the quadratic term is not statistically significant for well governed firms. Overall, the concave relationship is present for both well-governed and poorly-governed firms. The evidence is consistent with our view that accruals management can be utilized to enhance the corporate investment response to investment opportunities.
Conclusion
We empirically investigate the relationship between intertemporal transfer of earnings and the efficiency of corporate investment decisions. Using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of such earnings management, we document that earnings management exhibits a concave relationship with the investment sensitivity to investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q. We find that the relationship between earnings management and investment efficieny is concentrated among firms with relatively high investment opportunities.
The effect is present among firms with good corporate governance measures, suggesting that better governed firms manage accruals strategically. The concave relationship suggests that the marginal impact of earnings management on investment efficiency decreases with the amount of earnings management. Using misreporting that leads to restatement in future dates, we document that a more severe form of earnings management does not improve investment efficiency. We implement a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to disentangle causality in a quasi-experimental setting around the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find a large reduction in investment efficiency for US firms (treatment group) relative to those in UK and Canada (control group) around the passage of SOX. Taken together, these results support the view that a moderate amount of earnings management helps improve corporate investment decisions while an excessive amount undoes the potential benefit of earnings management. Table 2 Accruals Management and Investment
This table presents estimation results of the baseline specification:
where the dependent variable is investment scaled by beginning-of-year capital. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parenthesis.
(1) 
where Restate is set to one if a firm misreports in the given firm-year, and zero otherwise. This table examine the effects of accruals management on investment by estimating changes in investment efficiency around the implementation of SOX. Column (1) reports estimates from the following regression:
. Columns (2) through (4) report estimates from the following difference-in-differences (DID) regression:
where α i and γ t are firm and year fixed effects, 1 (SOX) is a dummy variable (Post-SOX) taking a value of one in the years following the implementation of SOX and zero otherwise, and 1 (i=T ) is a dummy variable set equal to one for firms that belong to the treatment group and zero for firms in the control group. The treatment group is U.S. firms and the control group consists of firms located in the United Kingdom and Canada. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parenthesis.
Control Sample (1) This figure plots the Epanechnikov kernal density investment rates for both US firms ("treatment") and Canadian/UK firms ("control") for the period before and after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A KolmogorovSmirnov test for the equality of distributions is rejected at the 1% level for the treatment group. Pre−SOX Post−SOX
Control Group
